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Alan Hydet
Was the software and marketing company that I shall call Individuate
one of America's one hundred best places to work in early 2000?' Its
human resources director, whom I shall call Farah, certainly thought it
could be, and so did many of its employees. Its analytic software, which
analyzed customer behavior during online and offline shopping, was very
successful. Individuate had successfully merged two very different
companies to develop the product. Originally a San Francisco marketing
company catering to retailers, Farah told me later, it was full of "hip,
stylish people from marketing and advertising, dressed in black." In 1999,
they realized that they needed to merge with a database company and chose
an East Bay firm named after a character from Egyptian mythology. The
database company was "full of kids wearing t-shirts and jeans" and
snobbish about their degrees from M.I.T., Cal Tech, and Stanford.
Nevertheless, the merger had worked out great-only two of the East Bay
kids had quit, because they did not want to commute into the city-and
after the get-acquainted parties, Bay cruise, and community-building,
everybody now "loved the new company." Business was great, salaries
were high, and benefits were generous-including stock options, full
medical and dental coverage, a 401(k) plan, free snacks and drinks, a
recreation room, and reduced rates on gym membership.
Like every other information technology or software company in the
Bay Area that year, the merged company was hiring all the time. Executive
management thought that it might help hiring and retention to have the
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1. The Individuate story comes from an interview with its former personnel director on
August 1, 2001. The company's name, the personnel director's name, and many details
about the company have been changed.
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company recognized widely as a great employer, perhaps by being named a
"top company to work for" by business media. Farah looked into it and
learned that to make these lists, Individuate would have to show that it was
genuinely meeting employee demands. Therefore, Farah called open
meetings to find out what the staff wanted. The chief demand was for
further professional development and training. "The engineers wanted
classes in software skills. The sales people and customer support staff
wanted to know more about engineering." A small volunteer group formed
to work up a plan, and Farah met with them weekly. Consultants had
warned that it would be dangerous to raise expectations, but Farah was
"green," having only two years of experience as the human resources
director of the East Bay database company. The volunteer group also
realized that they wanted more information about the company's finances
and less hype. This became known around Individuate as "respect." After
all, the employees, at least at the time of the merger, had just worked for a
company in which they saw the CEO daily and asked him or her whatever
they wanted. A new Individuate CEO in early 2000 was exploring
expanding and taking the company public, and the employee groups
wanted more information about what this meant.
Although management had thought it would be "cool" to be one of the
hundred best places to work in America, it never met these employee
concerns. The company's stock fell, and management time was devoted to
the basic objective of steering the company through a rough market.
Employee initiatives, like training or sharing financial information, seemed
like a diversion. Management even opposed a suggestion box for
anonymous suggestions. More importantly, people felt demoralized and
began to take jobs elsewhere, easily done in mid-2000. By then, demand
had peaked for Individuate's software. The company stopped hiring in late
2000 and downsized in early 2001. Its plans to go public have been
shelved.
The lesson of the Individuate story seems ambiguous to me. The
company seems typical. Its only unusual feature was its goal to be listed as
one of the "hundred best companies to work for." Not many companies
engaged in such projects. Nevertheless, plenty of Silicon Valley
companies in 2000 probably believed that they belonged on that list. I
think that most of them, had they pursued that listing, would have
discovered, as the consultants warned Farah, that introducing employee
consultation into an organization that lacks responsiveness to employee
suggestions can create false expectations. What is the solution to this
problem? Does the Individuate story show the need for new forms of
employee organization in Silicon Valley? Or does it demonstrate the need
for old-fashioned employee organization like labor unions? Does it
indicate the inevitability of informal modes of representation such as
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meetings, volunteer committees, and intranet communication? Or does it
merely demonstrate the harm that comes from consulting employees at all?
Ambiguity about formal employee organization pervades much of the
literature on high-tech employment. The Silicon Valley engineer or
manager has symbolized both social isolation and a high level of
networking. Scenes of Bill Hewlett, David Packard, Steve Jobs, and Steve
Wozniak tinkering in garages update the image of Charles Lindbergh
individualism. Similarly, the first character introduced in Robert Bellah's
influential book is a Silicon Valley executive named Brian Palmer.2 He
stands for devotion to work and family, commitment to individualism, and
isolation from any kind of political or social organization.3 By contrast, the
managers and engineers in AnnaLee Saxenian's book pushed Silicon
Valley ahead of Boston's Route 128 due to their dense network of personal
ties with their counterparts at rivals, subcontractors, suppliers, and former
employers.4 Nevertheless, neither the isolate nor the networked seem to
have much time for formal group membership.
Information-labor markets create roles for new labor market
intermediaries, like Internet job boards, which match employees to jobs and
provide information.5 Do these intermediaries create opportunities for
employee organizations, such as old-fashioned unions or some new kind of
employee organization? Many people have speculated along these lines or
worked to create such new organizations, but so far results are thin on the
ground. This article will discuss four kinds of employee organizations and
how they relate to information-labor markets like Silicon Valley's. They
include network-based employee groups that communicate on computer
networks; ethnic and gender-based groups that transcend firm boundaries;
other groups organized as caucuses by firms; and new employee groups
designed for mobile workers, such as Working Partnerships in San Jose,
and Working Today, a New York-based group not yet active in Silicon
Valley.
These new forms of employee organizations are full of vitality, play
2. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 3-8 (1985) (introducing the Brian Palmer character).
3. Id.
4. See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) (contrasting the industrial systems
between Silicon Valley and Route 128).
5. See David H. Autor, Wiring the Labor Market, 15 J. EcON. PERSP. 25, 26-30 (2001)
(discussing the consequences of the Internet for labor markets). HYDE, supra note *, at ch. 4,
discusses the implications of such new labor market intermediaries. The premise of an
"information-labor market" is that labor markets with short tenures and weak internal labor
markets are markets for information. Individuals may be hired for the information they
contribute. One sees network effects, endogenous growth through information spillover,
multiple equilibria, increasing returns, as well as start-up firms, job turnover, information
intermediaries, flexible compensation. Id.
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interesting roles, and raise policy dilemmas that are best resolved by
examining the full picture of this high-velocity labor market. Like other
Silicon Valley work practices, they also raise questions at the cutting edge
of economic analysis.6 Specifically, they all are institutions of information
transmission, also known as "employee voice." They have little bargaining
or other labor market power. The economics of institutions of employee
voice are not well understood.
Yet whether any of them will endure in the new economy is somewhat
doubtful, particularly as compared with Internet job boards and websites,
and temporary help agencies.7 The question that pervades this entire article
is whether an employee-directed organization, which seeks to provide
assistance, support, and information to employees, offers any advantage
over proprietary organizations that aspire to provide the same services.
For lower-compensated employees in the labor market, such as office
temps, and perhaps even programmers, none of these new groups is a good
substitute for a traditional union. If unionism ever comes to Silicon
Valley's high-velocity labor market, it will likely more closely resemble
the old-fashioned American construction union. The construction union is
the best organization ever devised for a mobile or contingent workforce-
so good that one rarely thinks of unionized construction workers as
"contingent." Today's temps, product-testers, and low-level programmers,
would be much better off with an organization that administered (jointly
with employer groups) funds, that paid retirement, health, and vacation
benefits, into which employers paid per hour worked, organizations that
also trained and certified employees. Since, as we shall see, current labor
law makes it unnecessarily difficult for temporary and mobile workers to
form unions, that law should be changed. If unions were successful in such
labor markets, they could in turn be the model for higher-salaried technical
labor like customer service representatives or even programmers. This
article will describe such an organization after surveying the forms of
employee organization that actually exist in the Valley. First, this article
will examine existing unions.
I. UNIONS
Rates of union membership are not available by county, but most
people think that Santa Clara County is very lightly unionized. In high-
technology industries, unions are hardly present at all. At a high-
technology company, the only employee who is typically represented by a
union is the janitor, most likely represented by Local 1877 of the Service
6. See HYDE, supra note *, at ch. 4 (analyzing a high-technology labor market as a
market for information).
7. See id.
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Employees International Union.8 Recruiting such a janitor is a remarkable
organizing feat. Almost all the usual excuses for failed union organizing
might have applied to that janitor. He or she is probably an immigrant
from Mexico with little English language proficiency. The janitor has few
job skills and can easily be replaced. Finally, the janitor is not an employee
of a high-technology company like Sun or Apple, but typically works for a
cleaning contractor.
The Service Employees became the janitors' union after a brilliant
organizing campaign built around appeals to Mexican cultural pride. The
campaign involved religious and political leaders, demonstrations, and
fiestas. The coup de grace was a consumer boycott of Apple computers
and other products sold by high-technology companies that hired the
cleaning contractors.9 Local 1877 now represents a majority of the
Valley's janitors.0
Besides Local 1877, membership in labor unions in high-technology
companies in Silicon Valley is minimal. The Communication Workers
made news headlines in late 2000 with organizational efforts to form a
union among customer service representatives at the San Francisco on-line
retailers etown and Amazon.com in Seattle." This union organizing effort
ended when etown went out of business and Amazon.com eliminated the
corporate division in which the union had the greatest strength.1 2 In the
1970's, when there were more manufacturing companies in the Valley,
there were unsuccessful union attempts to organize production workers. 3
The only known unionized Web business is a special case. Online
Television Network Services, Inc. (OTVnet.com) is a San Diego firm that
develops on-line communication tools for labor union clients administering
8. Gary Rivlin, Cleaning Up in Silicon Valley, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Apr. 24, 2000,
available at http://www.thestandard.comlarticle/0,1902,14319,00.html.
9. Christian Zlolniski, The Informal Economy in an Advanced Industrialized Society:
Mexican Immigrant Labor in Silicon Valley, 103 YALE L.J. 2305, 2313-16 (1994); Jesis
Martinez Saldaiia, At the Periphery of Democracy: The Binational Politics of Mexican
Immigrants in Silicon Valley 115-25 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Berkeley). See generally David Bacon, Organizing Silicon Valley's High Tech
Workers (1997), at http:lwww.igc.orgldbaconlUnions/O4hitecO.htm (last visited Nov. 26,
2001) (discussing union organizing across several industries). The consumer boycotts did
not violate federal prohibitions on secondary boycotts, which do not reach consumer
boycotts carried out by means other than picketing. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla.
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 569 (1988) (holding that even if
handbilling not involving a distributor is outside the publicity proviso's protection, that does
not require the conclusion that distributing handbills is coercive under § 8(b)(4)(ii)).
10. Rivlin, supra note 8.
11. David M. Ewalt, IT Workers Look at the Union Label - Dissatisfied Dot-corn
Workers Look to Labor Organizers to Blunt Effects of Economic Slowdown, INFO. WK.,
Mar. 19, 2001, at93.
12. Id.
13. Bacon, supra note 9, at 10.
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multi-employer benefits plans. Its management was happy to recognize
Local 569 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers as the
representative of its five production and development technicians. 4 Their
collective bargaining agreement prohibits discharge without cause and
offers unusual benefits. 15
Almost all the work practices identified with Silicon Valley, which are
discussed more fully in Working in Silicon Valley, are said to be obstacles
to union organizing, particularly short job tenures, heavy use of temporary
labor, and heavy use of immigrant labor. 6 But, as the example of the
janitors' union suggests, these characteristics may also present
opportunities for union organizing.
Union image is often the biggest obstacle to union organizing. When
unions come up in my interviews, people in the Valley, who rarely have
much direct experience with unions, associate unions with traditional union
roles in traditional labor markets. Many people who respond this way are
thinking of real union practices that, like the economics and law of
employment relationships, have developed against an assumption of
internal labor markets, typically in manufacturing industries. Such unions
negotiate detailed multi-year collective agreements that link compensation
and benefits to detailed job descriptions, with each job holding a place in a
defined hierarchy. The benefits included in such agreements are back-
loaded, creating returns for seniority. Management agreed to these terms to
discourage turnover and realize other gains that come from a stable, senior
workforce. 17 Companies that do not gain the benefit of a senior workforce
may resist unions to such a degree that they discourage employee interest.18
In such a case, the union's only real weapon is to strike. Strikes expose
employees to the risks of job loss and to the stress of conflict, and may only
succeed against some employers.
This image of unions is at best a partial picture of how unions work.
Such an image is what cognitive scientists call a prototype.' 9 For example,
if asked to picture a bird, most people in our culture will picture a robin or
bluebird. Few will imagine an ostrich or flamingo. Similarly, the
prototype for unions for years has been the United Automobile Workers.
When asked to picture a union, people automatically think of automobile
workers. People also picture union work, detailed contracts, job
14. John Roemer, Should Tech Workers Unite? INDUSTRY STANDARD, Jan. 23, 2001, at
http://www.thestandard.com/search?keyword=roemer &stype=d&tf= E& month=01 &day=
23&year=-2001 #newsletter.
15. Id.
16. See HYDE supra note *
17. See generally RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do?
ch. 8 (1984) (asserting that unions create returns for seniority).
18. RICHARD B. FREEMAN& JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT ch. 4 (1999).
19. STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE AND MIND (2001).
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descriptions, formal grievance systems, and fixed compensation.
This image of unions offers little to most employees in high-velocity
labor markets and even less to their employers. There is currently very
little manufacturing of any kind in Silicon Valley.20 Before the 1990's,
large firms like Hewlett-Packard and Sun did manufacturing work in
Silicon Valley. During this period, no new unions emerged.
Manufacturing work was largely conducted by non-unionized immigrant
women. By now, most manufacturing has moved overseas and is no
longer carried out by the "manufacturers" of computers or equipment, who
outsource over eighty percent of production work.22
Industrial unionism is not the only kind of unionism. Employees in
Silicon Valley have developed some of their own forms of organization.
This article discusses employee groups on electronic networks, ethnic and
gender based networks and formal caucuses, and some new associations
designed specifically to appeal to mobile, educated workers. On the one
hand, unions may adopt these organizational forms, possibly in
combination with some traditional union forms. On the other hand, unions
may never become established in Silicon Valley, but the new organizations
may flourish. Neither of these outcomes is likely. Neither the Valley, nor
any other portion of the U.S. economy, will likely ever become heavily
unionized, and the organizations in this article-networks, caucuses, and
new employee groups-are unlikely to involve more than small pockets of
the labor force. However, the unconventional nature of these groups has
already challenged traditional labor and employment law. It is therefore
important to examine how the legal system responds to these challenges
brought by new forms of employee organization.
Employees and employers in Silicon Valley often associate labor
unions with traditional labor markets, and therefore view them as
antithetical to their high-velocity labor market. One of the most robust
generalizations in industrial relations, however, is that unions take their
structure from the employers they face. In truth, they extrapolate the
20. Dieter Ernst, FROM PARTIAL TO SYSTEMIC GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL
PRODUCTION NETwORKs IN THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY (Berkeley Roundtable on the Int'l
Econ., Univ. of California, Working Paper No. 98, 1997), available at
http:l/vww.ciaonet.orglwps/erdol (last visited Nov. 29, 2001).
21. See generally GUADALUPE M. FRIAZ, LABOR STRATIFICATION AND DOWNSIZING IN
COMPUTER MANUFACTURING: EFFEcTS ON WHITE WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR (Julian
Samora Research Inst., Working Paper No. 23, 1996) (demonstrating that women held a
large percent of the computer manufacturing jobs); Karen J. Hossfeld, 'Their Logic Against
Them': Contradictions in Sex, Race, and Class in Silicon Valley, in WOMEN WORKERS AND
GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING (Kathryn Ward, ed., 1990); Bacon, supra note 9 (analyzing the
difficulties of unionizing in Silicon Valley and concluding that labor laws are frequently not
helpful in protecting workers in this high-tech region).
22. Ernst, supra note 20.
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problems they address from specific employers. 23 For instance, unions that
face small craft-oriented firms will organize on craft lines. Some European
or Latin American unions that face large corporate national enterprise,
largely funded by the national capital under government guidance, focus
their attentions on political parties and centralized bargaining. The
economic story of the twentieth century was, until recently, the rise of the
large corporation that realized economies of scope and scale.14 Unions that
deal with such corporations are associated with detailed contracts, job
descriptions, and seniority rights.
None of these features, however, is inherent to labor unions, or would
have much relevance in a high-velocity labor market. Therefore, there is a
need to examine new high-velocity labor markets against a scholarly
tradition in economics, law, and industrial relations that so often assumes
the stable career ladders in large corporations.
II. EMPLOYEE ACTION ON COMPUTER NETWORKS
Employees with access to in-house computer networks can take
collective action with a speed and efficacy that many traditional unions
might envy. Consider the action by employees at Apple Computer in 1990
described by Bishop and Levine.25 Apple had encouraged employee use of
an internal computer bulletin board. Its training materials noted that its
recycling program "got started when someone suggested it in a [network]
discussion. 2 6  Other discussions had concerned policies on hiring
minorities, smoking in buildings, and naming conventions for shared
computers. 27 Fifty top executives received periodic two-page summaries of
the main issues discussed on the network, under the title "What Employees
Want.
,2 1
In January 1990, Apple management announced revisions to the
profit-sharing plan that would have eliminated any payments to employees
in quarters with slow sales growth.29 "Literally hundreds of postings were
entered on [the electronic bulletin board] in the busiest days. All told, on
23. See generally CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION (1988) (arguing that unions borrow their
organizational structure from employers).
24. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF
INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM (1990) (describing the development of the managerial business
enterprise that provides the central dynamic to global capitalism).
25. See Libby Bishop & David I. Levine, Computer-Mediated Communication as
Employee Voice: A Case Study, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 213, 218-24 (1998).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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the order of one thousand messages were received. This issue elicited a
greater volume of response than had any event in the history of the
company. The system was literally swamped. 30 Most responses attacked
the reductions in the profit-sharing payments, often bitterly, while a
minority defended them.3' A common early theme was that "employees
wanted a complete explanation for why the change in profit-sharing was
necessary, and how it would encourage growth as management claimed.,
32
CEO John Sculley posted such explanations on the bulletin board, but
many employees remained unconvinced. Ultimately, management caved
in. Everyone interviewed for a Harvard Business School case attributed
this to the effect of the electronic bulletin board.33
Meanwhile, one employee looked through bulletin board transcripts
and recorded all the contributors to the profit-sharing debate who had used
their actual names. He wrote to each identifiable contributor, suggesting
that they should all meet. A small group formed and met quietly several
times that winter. Independently, a second employee posted a bulletin
board message calling for the formation of a concerned employees' league.
The two groups later merged under the name "Employees for One Apple."
In May 1990, fifty employees attended the first meeting of the merged
group, which was announced on the bulletin board. The group sought the
restoration of the "corporate culture they recalled (perhaps in a somewhat
idealized form) from a few years previous." They sought increased
communication with top management, fewer management "perks" and
other distinctions among employees, and an institutionalized voice for
employees. "Members of One Apple" repeatedly pointed out that they
loved Apple. Conversely, most members and leaders we interviewed went
out of their way to note that they were opposed to a union at Apple... they
did not want outsiders involved and they did not want a union bureaucracy
to intervene between employees and managers." 34
Management, however, resisted formal employee representation. As
of the date of Bishop and Levine's study, the only effect of the agitation
over organization was the formation of an Employee-Executive Forum in
which fifteen employees, randomly selected from among volunteers,
discussed their concerns with top managers.35 The Forum had no rights to
information or consultation and no decision-making authority. It was
supposed to meet quarterly but, in fact, met less frequently.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Michael J. Gibbs, Apple Computer (B): Managing Morale and Corporate Culture, 9
HARV. Bus. SCH. CASE491 (1991).
34. Bishop & Levine, supra note 25, at 221.
35. Bishop & Levine, supra note 25, at 223.
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Other companies that have announced changes in compensation, both
inside and outside of Silicon Valley, have similarly faced what the New
York Times calls "The Electronic Rank and File".36 In 1999, IBM reversed
its previous position and more than doubled the number of employees
permitted to keep a traditional, defined-benefit pension plan. The
following year, Bell Atlantic similarly announced, then retracted, plans to
switch employees to a "cash balance" plan with variable benefits. In each
case, employees set up websites that compared the two plans and linked to
the websites regarding pension rights published by government agencies,
Congressional offices, and other organizations.37 The IBM site was visited
more than 97,000 times that year and became a model for employees at
other firms.38 "I just don't see how we could have done it without the
Web," said Lynda French, creator of the cashpensions website.39 Although
they offered no alternative explanation for their changes of mind, both IBM
and AT&T denied that they had been influenced by the on-line pressure
from employees.
A. Economic Analysis of Employee Voice Groups
Economic analysis of unions often begins, as a result of Freeman and
Medoff's work,40 by distinguishing the effects of a cartel of labor from the
effects of a "voice" for labor. The economic analysis of unions as labor
cartels is well developed, while few generalizations can be made about the
effects of union "voice."
In the case of a standard, old-economy union, it may be very difficult
to untangle the economic effects of its different functions. A unionized
company, as compared with a nonunion counterpart, will pay higher wages
and benefits, has a lower turnover rate, and will be more likely to terminate
employees than adjust compensation. Do these effects, commonly
associated with unions, reflect "cartels" or "voice?" The cartel effect is
evident due to the union's ability to threaten or organize a strike. The voice
effect is evident when the employer in a unionized workplace focuses on
the average, as opposed to the marginal, employee. It might seem that this
36. Virginia Munger Kahn, The Electronic Rank and File, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at
G1.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Kahn, supra note 36, at G1. See also Cash Balance Pensions and Retirement Plan
Conversions Website!, at http://www.cashpensions.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2001)
(comparing plans and providing information on pension benefits).
40. See generally FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 17 (analyzing the role of trade
unions in the United States by comparing outcomes in union settings to similar non-union
settings and concluding that unions have both a monopoly and a voice "face" and that
unions can improve the free enterprise system in the United States).
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voice effect would never be observable unless the union had its cartel
power. Perhaps few employers would learn much about employee
preferences from a union, given the more sophisticated tools available to
learn about employee sentiments, including quality of work life groups and
teams. Based on the assumption that employers are so well-informed, one
would think that only the threat of economic harm through collective
bargaining could change employers' behavior. This view is mistaken, for
reasons explained below.
Groups such as the networked groups at Apple or IBM present a novel
problem for the economic analysis of institutions of employee "voice."
They have no cartel effects, nor are cartel effects feasible in a high-velocity
labor market. These groups do not strike. Their effect on turnover and
"quits" is unknown. It may be significant that neither Apple nor IBM is a
stereotypical startup with rapid turnover (such as Individuate). Neither
research nor interviews turned up accounts of similar employee-networked
action at a high-turnover startup. Surely there must have been such actions,
at least over unhappiness about relatively minor job dissatisfactions. In a
startup, though, such actions could not be based on the rhetoric of
restoration of the former regime. Perhaps such rhetoric is more important
to electronic action than it seems. Electronic action may be hard to
organize except in defense of existing benefits.
Most likely, employee action on electronic networks has a very bright
future, far beyond the reported instances in which it has been mobilized in
defense of existing benefits. Network mobilization is a spectacular vehicle
for employee voice, which can be organized cheaply, quickly, and
effectively. Management has conceded under pressure from these
organizations, even when it did not face a threatened strike. The Apple
employees who participated in network mobilization did not understand the
extent of their own power. It is ironic that so much employee follow-up
went into creating silly and ineffective new institutions of employee voice.
These employees had already demonstrated their command over an
effective institution of employee voice-one that mobilizes not only
employee complaints, but managerial responses. A deeper irony is that
employees were effective without formal organization. When they were
simply posting complaints on the network, management responded to the
complaints and changed its course. After forming an organization and
seeking permanent channels of communication, they accomplished little.
While these Apple employees were not poor people, they would seem to
represent another illustration of Piven and Cloward's thesis that popular
protest often becomes ineffectual when organizers transform it into a mass
permanent organization.41
41. See generally FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S
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Of course, employee action on computer networks faces some severe
limitations. So far, it has been exclusively reactive. It is hard to imagine
how network groups could ever plan, link with other groups, or employ
professional assistance. Nevertheless, as means of mobilizing employee
voice for management response, it has a bright future, and will generate
legal cases in addition to those discussed below.
B. Employee Voice and "Morale"
It is not surprising that there is no developed economic analysis of
(pure) employee voice groups, since the concept appears for the first time
here. Such economic analysis might begin, however, by focusing on
employee morale, the striking and unexpected finding of Bewley.42
Bewley conducted over three hundred interviews during the Bush
recession of the early 1990's in order to learn why employers are so much
more likely to lay off employees than they are to adjust wages downward.
Most subjects named employee morale, a factor difficult to model
economically and often dismissed by economists. 43 Bewley's informants
use "morale" to cover all the factors that motivate high employee
performance without immediate reward and often without direct
monitoring by managers. 44  "Employers want workers to operate
autonomously, show initiative, use their imagination, and take on extra
tasks not required by management; workers who are scared or dejected do
not do these things. '45 Good morale includes employee satisfaction, a
sense that effort will be rewarded, and the expectation that employees will
cooperate spontaneously and share information among themselves and with
46supervisors. The last two factors are particularly difficult to motivate
either with threats or financial incentives.47 Pay cuts cause bad morale in
several different ways. The best employees will leave. Others will shirk or
retaliate. Reducing the compensation of new hires is not a good idea either.
"Managers regarded anything that upsets internal equity as potentially
disruptive. Lack of equity spawns jealousies, resentments, and perceptions
of unjust treatment.,as
MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL (Vintage Books ed., 1979).
42. See generally TRUMAN F. BEwLEY, WHY WAGES DON'T FALL DURING A RECESSION
(1999) (analyzing wage rigidity during economic downturns by surveying business
consultants in the Northeast during the recession of the early 1990's and concluding that
complicated employee behavior leads to manager reluctance to cut pay).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 431.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 433.
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Bewley does not specifically discuss collective bargaining. There was
a union presence in thirty-five of the 235 companies in his sample, but
those companies rarely appeared to behave in any special way.49
Nevertheless, Bewley's book represents an interesting vantage point
from which to rethink collective bargaining. It certainly captures the
dynamic of the Apple, IBM, and AT&T stories better than conventional
models of collective bargaining. Why did these employers give in to the
disgruntled employees on the internal network, when those employees did
not threaten a strike or boycott? When one understands the importance of
what management calls "morale," one can understand how "voice"
institutions might be effective without a strike threat. Management will go
to great lengths to avoid low employee morale. Perceived injustice or
inequity leads to bad morale. Institutions of employee voice that publicize
potential injustice or inequity transmit information regarding these
perceptions to employees and managers. They effect swift management
response, lest the best employees leave or all employees slacken their
voluntary cooperation.
Once again, a problem in the economics of labor and employment
turns out to be, to a significant degree, a problem in the economics of
information. Employee organizations that have only information effects
may, under some circumstances, be as effective or more effective than
organizations that can threaten or inflict economic harm through a strike.
Future models of even the prototypical version of collective bargaining will
have to account more effectively for this potent informational effect.
Networks would be appealing if they involved less than a majority of
employees, or if the employer opposed union organization. Either or both
of these situations exists in most U.S. workplaces, certainly including
Silicon Valley. By contrast, if the employer does not oppose employee
unionization, and a union represents a majority, it is hard to think of any
advantage to the employees in maintaining a network as opposed to a
union. If a union represented a majority of the employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit, it would have legal privileges that a network would lack.
The majority union could use the law to require employer bargaining, have
dues withheld from employee paychecks, or impose certain limited
discipline on its members. 50 A network with these privileges in addition to
its rapid mobilization of employee voice and employer response, would, in
theory, be more effective than a network without them. As Al Capone
allegedly said: you can go further in life with a kind word and a gun than
with a kind word alone. However, in practice, these legal privileges of a
49. See id. at 32-33 (discussing the wide variety of businesses studied, none of which
stood out in a particular way).
50. National Labor Relations Act, §§ 8(a)(3), 8(a)(5), 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. §§
158(a)(3), 158(a)(5), and 158(b)(1)(A).
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union might cut against the power of employee networks by triggering the
kind of employer opposition that networks have not so far faced.
Employers do have legal ways of not cooperating with unions, such as
refusing to recognize them until the government conducts an election, then
campaigning against them. Many employees, like those surveyed in
Freeman and Rogers, fear such employer opposition." Employees might
be drawn to network organization, particularly if employees were more
interested in employer responsiveness than in formal bargaining, since
employers do not seem to fight network organization.
C. Legal Issues Raised by Employee Voice Groups
No new legal framework is necessary to accommodate the new
network organizations of employee voice. These organizations are already
protected by existing labor law, which gives them two major privileges:
protection against employer retaliation, and some rights to equal treatment
52by the employer if the employer has a preferred employee organization.
These legal rights of such groups, and employees who participate in them,
come from the federal National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act.53 The
source of these rights is ironic because the employees involved in network
organizations are always careful to point out that they do not like unions
and are not trying to organize one.
Nevertheless, the Wagner Act protects the right of employees to
engage in "concerted activities for the purpose, ' 54 not merely of collective
bargaining, but of "other mutual aid or protection. 5 If an employee were
fired or otherwise punished for complaining about bonus changes on
internal networks, or for trying to get other employees to do something
about it, such an action would violate the Wagner Act and would be
corrected by the National Labor Relations Board on complaint by the
employee.5 The latter case specifically protects employee internal e-mails,
cast in the sarcastic tone so often found in e-mail.57 If the employer has its
own preferred forms of employee organization, it may have to extend the
51. See generally FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 18.
52. See PATRICIA WALLACE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNET 110-32 (1999)
(discussing aggression found on-line); Sara Kiesler & Lee Sproull, Group Decision Making
and Communication Technology, 52 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 96, 110 (1992) (showing that, unlike face-to-face communications, computer
discussion is more rude and impulsive).
53. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
54. 29 U.S.C § 157.
55. Id.
56. See Timekeeping Systems, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 250 (1997) (holding that
employee remarks on internal e-mail systems are protected concerted activity under
N.L.R.A. § 7).
57. See sources cited supra note 52.
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same privileges to the employee-organized group.58 For example, at the
time of the employee action on Apple's internal network, Apple promoted
employee caucuses including Black and Asian caucuses. Apple let those
groups have e-mail boxes, meeting spaces, and bulletin boards, and
therefore was likely obligated to extend the same privileges to an employee
network group,59 even if neither group is a statutory "labor organization. 60
There is no dispute over the proposition that employee action on
computer networks, or other informal group action without a union, is
nevertheless protected by federal labor law. There are, however, two
significant areas of legal uncertainty surrounding this protection. First, the
law on protected activity under the Wagner Act has often been applied to
deny protection to common action by unorganized employees.6 This is
particularly true when orders of the National Labor Relations Board come
before federal appeals courts. Judges insist, incorrectly, that the existence
of a union is necessary to obtain the Wagner Act's protection, or deny
protection because of the Rabelaisian language often favored by non-
unionized employees, particularly on e-mail. 62 Judges also invoke vague
rules about protest going "too far."63 These holdings are likely a result of
judicial hostility to the Wagner Act itself. However, the holdings also
reflect, in part, the power of that prototype of union organizing(e.g. the
robin, not the flamingo), and a refusal to understand that protecting the
actual activity of unrepresented employees is an equal priority of the
Wagner Act. This priority requires protecting the ways that non-unionized
employees present their grievances, not merely those channels that seem
appropriate to federal judges.
The more difficult legal question concerns access to company e-mail
systems. For example, Ken Hamidi is a former Intel engineer, bitter about
his termination, who is the most prominent figure in Former And Current
Intel Employees (FACE). FACE maintains a website posting information
58. See Alan Hyde et al., After Smyrna: Rights and Powers of Unions That Represent
Less Than a Majority, 45 RuTGERS L. REv. 637, 659-63 (1993) (discussing how an
employer must extend the same privileges to an insurgent group as those enjoyed by the
employer's representation plan).
59. See Black Grievance Comm. v. NLRB, 749 F.2d 1072, 1072 (3d Cir. 1984)
(holding that preferential treatment to one non-majority group over another is unlawful
interference).
60. NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1217 (1st Cir. 1979).
61. See Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of
Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 149, 171 (1993), reprinted in THE LEGAL FUTURE-
OF EmpLOYEE REPRESENTATION (Matthew Finkin ed., 1994) (arguing that the Wagner Act
needs to be interpreted so it can protect unorganized employees).
62. New River Indus. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290 (4th Cir. 1991) (denying protection to
Rabelaision language by unrepresented employees); Reef Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 952 F.2d
830 (5th Cir. 1991) (protecting such language because of union support).
63. NLRB v. Motorola, Inc., 991 F.2d 278,283-85 (5th Cir. 1993).
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on lawsuits against Intel by former employees alleging wrongful
termination, and other information critical of Intel.64 FACE is a kind of
network group, as the term is defined in this article. An Intel employee
could not be fired or disciplined for joining or participating in FACE.
Hamidi raised the legal stakes of employee network use by sending e-
mail messages to current Intel employees over Intel's internal network, an
activity that a California court has enjoined as trespass. 65 "Trespass" may
seem like a ridiculously old-fashioned way of thinking about an e-mail
network or any system of communications. After all, Intel probably could
not enjoin Hamidi from mailing letters to each of its employees.
Nonetheless, "trespass" is a surprisingly important concept in labor law,
and is turning out to be equally important in the law of electronic data.
In labor law, the concept of trespass permits an employer to bar
anyone who is not an employee from its physical property including union
organizers who are not employees. While employees have a federally
protected right to talk about organization among themselves and to hand
out literature, the employer does not have to let union organizers or any
other nonemployees onto its property. This right is framed as a property
right. The employer does not need to have any reason, and it does not
matter if its property is normally open to the public, such as a shopping
66center. There is, however, a dispute between the NLRB and some lower
courts that the Supreme Court may eventually resolve, as to whether an
employer that permits charitable solicitation of employees using company
property must extend similar privileges to union organizers. 67 Finally, state
courts may enjoin trespassers even if the NLRB might have held that they
are protected in cases where the alleged trespasser did not make any effort
to get the case before the NLRB.68 So, if the internal network is Intel
64. Former and Current Intel Employees, at http://www.faceintel.com. (last visited Mar.
19, 2002); see also BILL LESSARD & STEVE BALDWIN, NETSLAVES: TRUE TALES OF
WORKING THE WEB 182-97 (2000) (fictionalizing an account of Hamidi's activities).
65. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), review granted
and depublished, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 1883 (Cal. Mar. 27, 2002).
66. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 527 (1992) (holding that an employer
did not commit an unfair labor practice by banning non-employee union organizers from the
parking lot of its retail store).
67. Compare Four B Corp. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying
an exception to the general rule; that an employer can not bar union solicitation on its
property if the employer has permitted similar activities by other nonemployee groups) and
Riesbeck Food Mkts., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 940, 942 (1994), enforcement denied, 91 F.3d 132
(4th Cir. 1996) (discussing the discriminatory nature of a company's policy and practice to
distinguish among various solicitations of its customers), with Sandusky Mall Co. v. NLRB,
242 F.3d 682, 683 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the Board's discrimination theory).
68. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 180 (1978) (discussing the differences between issues presented to the state court
versus the NLRB).
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"property" under California law, the California court was not wrong to
enjoin Hamidi from using it. States are largely free in the constitutional
system to define "property," and California has in fact decided that owners
of shopping centers and other property open to the world do not have a
property right to keep out union organizers. 69 People who do not have a
state property right to exclude trespassers do not have a federal labor law
right to do so, either.70  However, Intel's internal e-mail system, unlike
shopping centers, is not routinely open to people other than Intel
employees.
All of these problems could be avoided in the future if FACE
messages were sent by Intel employees lawfully authorized to send
messages over the network. Sending such messages would be
presumptively protected by the National Labor Relations Act. Employees
could not be disciplined for sending such messages, unless Intel could
show some unusual disruption or harm, or that the system is not open to
employee messages of any kind.71 An employer with an e-mail or bulletin
board open to all employees could not have a rule forbidding union or
organizational messages.
E-mail systems and databases of addresses are held to be property in
cases involving either "spain" (unsolicited bulk e-mail) or what is now
called "hacking" (an unauthorized breach of system security). If an
outsider accesses a data system and misappropriates information or causes
harm, the owner may sue under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(hereinafter "CFAA).72 It has become common practice in such suits to
include a separate claim under state trespass law.73 Hamidi probably did
not violate the CFAA, since he did not damage Intel's data or acquire any
for himself. However, his messages were a kind of unsolicited bulk e-mail
or spam, and spam is so unpopular that courts are unlikely to be criticized
when they hold that owners of networks are empowered to ban it. It has
been argued that courts should allow people like Hamidi to send messages
69. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (holding that
speech and petitioning in privately-owned shopping centers are protected).
70. See Bristol Farms, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 437,437 (1993) (allowing union supporters to
picket peacefully in front of a store).
71. See, e.g., Wash. Adventist Hosp., 291 N.L.R.B. 95, 95 (1988) (ruling on a hospital
communication system that was not open to any employee messages).
72. 18 U.S.C §§ 1030 (1999) (prohibiting fraud in connection with computers).
73. See, e.g., Register.Corn v. Verio, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18846, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2000) (demonstrating that plaintiffs who sue for hacking under the CFAA
of 1986 also sue for trespass); Am. Online Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Discount, Inc., 121 F.
Supp. 2d 1255, 1277 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (reaffirming that plaintiffs simultaneously sue under
the CFAA and make claims for trespass of chattels); Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100
F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (offering another example of a plaintiff suing
under CFAA and also for trespass).
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to employees via e-mail.74 It would be a surprise if such access was
attained by former employees or union organizers. Recall that employees
with access to internal networks may send such messages, and are
protected by federal law if they do.
The most interesting legal issues raised by network groups and other
"employee voice institutions" may arise in the long term. It is conventional
to assert that labor law recognizes some harm to the public from
unrestrained cartel effects and, on many issues, takes the form that it does
in order to trim some of those cartel effects. This might be true of
limitations on union secondary boycotts, application of antitrust laws to
certain labor activities, and obligations that labor unions observe internal
democracy and offer fair representation to individuals. If one really were
faced with employee action that involved strictly "voice" effects without
risk of cartel, one might expect greater scope for its action.
III. ETHNIC ORGANIZATIONS AND NETWORKS
The popular picture of the isolated Silicon Valley engineer, while not
totally inaccurate, turns out to be somewhat ethnocentric. 5  Silicon
Valley's large immigrant population makes extensive use, not only of
informal ethnic ties, but also of formal, ethnic-based network
organizations.76
About thirty percent of the Valley's high-tech workforce was foreign-
born in 1990, about one-third of all scientists and engineers. Of these,
almost two-thirds were Asian, the majority Chinese or Indian.78  By
contrast, half of this proportion of foreign-born scientists and engineers
works in Massachusetts and Texas.7 9 Chinese and Indian engineers run
one-quarter of the region's technology businesses started since 1980, in
companies that collectively account for more than $12.5 billion in annual
sales and 46,290 jobs.80
AnnaLee Saxenian demonstrates the importance of formal
74. See Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 38-40
(2000) (asserting that it has been argued that people have a right to send unsolicited e-
mails). See also The Long Arm of Cyber-Reach, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1610, 1622-24 (1999)
(comparing Hamidi's e-mails to protected, in person, distribution of information).
75. See, e.g., BELLAH ET AL., supra note 2.
76. Here I use "network" in the older sociological sense, and not to imply use of
computer-mediated communication.
77. See ANNALEE SAxENIAN, SILICON VALLEY'S NEW IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS 11-
26 (1999).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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organization in this economic success story.81 She lists thirteen formal
professional associations of Chinese or Indian engineers that foster
networking and support along fairly narrow ethnic lines. 2 For example,
there are distinct associations of engineers who originate from Taiwan who
speak Mandarin at meetings, from Hong Kong who speak Cantonese, from
mainland China, and Chinese engineers who prefer to speak English. 3
Another association was named The Indus Entrepreneur to include
Pakistanis, Bangladeshi, and Nepalese; however, its members are almost all
Indian. 4 These associations put professionals in touch with role models
and sources of venture capital, serve as important sources of information
about market or job opportunities, and offer formal and informal lessons in
the basic facts of entrepreneurship, management, and English
85communication.
If unions may seem a little too old-fashioned to fit with high
technology culture, what about ethnic-based network groups? They link
the Valley community with the immigrant cultures of the last century.
They also link the Valley's richest and poorest immigrants. The Mexican
janitor and gardener are likely to be part of a network of relatives and
friends, often from the same city in Mexico, who share living and
economic arrangements and provide information on job opportunities.86
These ethnic networks were central in the successful organization of their
union. 7 The Mexican networks, however, are rarely formal organizations
with names and meetings, and they are not linked electronically. The only
employee organization that can truly be said to be employed both by high-
end and low-end contingent workers in the Valley is the ethnic-based
network.
For Chinese and Indian engineers, the chief economic aspect of the
ethnic network is a path toward entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship
opportunities are also provided by the Mexican networks, though these
networks also assist in union organizing." The engineer meets role models
and sources of venture capital. The janitor advances by becoming a
contractor himself or herself, or uses the network for an informal sales
81. Seeid. at 27-51.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Zlolniski, supra note 9, at 2313 (affirming the existence of Mexican network
groups).
87. See Saldafia, supra note 9 (indicating that network groups indeed affect union
formation).
88. See id (discussing how both networks also perform some aspects of the labor
market intermediaries that provide information matching employees to opportunities).
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business, or even an informal dentistry practice.89 The entrepreneurship
path is crucial to understanding the groups as employee organizations and
also to understanding patterns of immigration. It also increases the role of
business ownership in a high-velocity labor market, in which employers do
not offer lifetime careers and individual advancement normally requires
exit from the firm and entry into either new employment, self-employment,
or business ownership. Employees in such a high-velocity labor market can
outperform employees in a traditional internal job tournament.9° The
promise of advancement outside the firm can be a powerful motivator of
performance. For this to be true, the promise must be bound-as it is in the
Valley-in a new implicit contract. The employee will leave his or her
current firm with skill and experience that he or she lacked coming in and
will be able to exploit that knowledge in the next workplace, or at the
employee's own business. Based on this understanding of how the promise
of entrepreneurship shapes employee organizations, this article suggests
that other new employee organizations will take advantage of this
promise. 91
In contrast to their entrepreneurship functions, ethnic-based networks
of employees, while transcending particular employers, have not yet taken
on the role of advancing employee interests as employees. One group that
advances employee interests in the workplace is the Immigrants Support
Network, which lobbies and organizes for changes in the treatment of
immigrants on temporary visas. This article will address this group
separately. Although dominated by Indian members, the group aspires to
speak for immigrants more generally, so this article will treat them as a
"new organization" rather than a "formal ethnic-based organization."
Ethnic-based networks do not appear to have provided the basis for such
informal protests as the Apple profit-sharing or IBM pension protests
discussed earlier in this article. They do not go to bat for individual
employees with grievances against particular employers or labor
contractors. Though this must happen on an informal basis, no specific
example was found.
Are ethnic-based employee networks simply creatures of the recent
immigrant experience that may fade away as immigrant groups become
more acculturated? Or are they prototypes for new forms of employee
organizations that can be used by other groups of employees-not merely
new immigrant groups, but other groups of employees? Will such
networks take on any additional functions of new labor market
intermediaries: information, job matching, or possibly benefits? Will they
89. Zlolniski, supra note 9, at ch.2.
90. See HYDE, supra note *.
91. See generally HYDE, supra note * (discussing the role of entrepreneurship in civil
rights or antidiscrimination strategies for high-velocity labor markets).
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remain best suited to advancing job exit through entrepreneurship? Will
they ever take on representational functions for employees? While it is too
soon to answer any of these questions definitively, tentative answers may
be gleaned from examining two other kinds of employee groups: formal
ethnic caucuses organized by, or with the cooperation of, large firms, and
women's networks.
IV. FORMAL ETHNIC CAUCUSES FOR LARGE EMPLOYERS
While no Silicon Valley employer has a union of technical personnel,
several encourage formal caucuses. For example, Apple Computer has a
formal Multicultural Alliance including Asian, African-American,
Hispanic, Lesbian and Gay, Professional Women, and Vietnamese
caucuses. These caucuses are defined almost exclusively as vehicles for
the advancement of individual group members within firm hierarchies.
They play little or no role in linking women, Latino, Asian or African-
American employees across firm boundaries. Their inability to perform the
latter function impedes their utility in the emerging high-velocity labor
market.
The basic model of an employee identity caucus is familiar.92 "The
issue that African American network groups deal with is, broadly speaking,
the acceptance, comfort, and career achievement of Black employees. 93
The same might be said of other network groups. Their main activities
include mutual support, networking, exchange of information, particularly
regarding managerial vacancies, and advice. Within a sample of Fortune
and Service 500 companies responding to a survey, twenty-nine percent
had network groups-typically African-American, women's, or both.
Groups are often initiated by managers who are not part of the group, and
who seek assistance in recruiting, or assistance for some other purpose,
such as reviewing an affirmative action plan or planning Black History
month. The group then stays together to pursue its own objectives.
Groups tend to be dominated by professional or managerial employees
even when nominally open to others. 4 They almost never make formal
demands or requests of management. When managers express concerns
92. See generally RAYMOND A. FRIEDMAN & DONNA CARTER, AFRICAN AMERICAN
NETWORK GROUPS: THEIR IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS (1993) (relying on phone interviews,
surveys, and field visits to analyze the impact of African American Network Groups and
make recommendations on the capabilities of such groups and how they may be formed);
Raymond A. Friedman, Defining the Scope and Logic of Minority and Female Network
Groups: Can Separation Enhance Integration? 14 RES. PERSONNEL & HuM. RESOURCES
MGMT. 307, 308-12 (1996) (addressing the benefits of employee network groups devoted to
furthering the interests of women and minorities in management positions).
93. FRIEDMAN & CARTER, supra note 92, at 3.
94. Id. at 16.
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about the formation of such groups, they fear that the groups will be
confrontational and union-like. Groups are sensitive to this fear and avoid
confrontation or demands. This is certainly true of the Silicon Valley
groups. The sole categorical exception found through database news
searches and personal discussions was gay and lesbian caucuses, which
typically request that corporate benefits programs be opened to nonmarried
domestic partners. When this request is granted, such groups generally
make no further demands and revert to a more typical social-and-support
group.95 Sometimes African-American or women's caucuses, particularly
when asked to review an affirmative action plan, may suggest numerical
goals. They may also request changes in formal job posting, evaluation,
mentoring programs, sensitivity training and cultural awareness programs.
Still, the human resources managers surveyed by Friedman and Carter
ranked "influence policies" the second-lowest among potential functions
actually accomplished by network groups. Thus, while almost no problems
or downside can be identified in the existence of identity caucuses, their
positive role seems largely limited to career and psychic support for their
particular members.
Silicon Valley firms often have active caucus systems that largely
replicate this pattern of corporate loyalty and devotion to career
advancement. For example, in March 1996, Apple Computer had a formal
Multicultural Alliance consisting of six employee groups (Asian, Black,
Hispanic, Lesbian and Gay, Professional Women, and Vietnamese).96 A
"senior specialist, multicultural program" publicized their efforts and acted
as liaison with management. Christian fellowship and Jewish cultural
groups were, at that time, functioning outside the Alliance. All of these
groups were "identity caucuses." The human resources specialist in 1996,
Toni Tomacci, told me laughingly: "There are no Employees for a
Democratic Apple, or for Higher Bonuses." Groups, funded mostly by
individual contribution, got e-mail boxes, meeting places, and permission
to plan public events. All of their activities consisted either of "social,
networking" functions or of helping the company use diversity for business
success, such as tapping Asian or Latin American markets. Groups have
persuaded Apple to fund conferences of professional women or mentoring
programs at historically black colleges. Particularly when planning
conferences, groups may link up informally with counterpart caucuses at
Hewlett-Packard or Xerox, but nobody knows of any links with larger
community or political organizations.
At least one group formally links identity caucuses, though it still
95. Maureen Scully, Remarks at the Spring Meeting of the Industrial Relations
Research Association (1997).
96. Interview with Toni Tomacci, Senior Specialist, Human Resources, Apple
Computer, (March 1996).
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excludes larger community or political organizations. A National Hispanic
Employee Association (NHEA) is active in the Bay Area and elsewhere.
The NHEA held Second Annual Breaking Barriers Awards Conference in
San Jose, California, on March 15, 1996. However, the group is not even
the beginning of an "associational union".97  Rather, it describes its
"mission and vision.., to promote the upward mobility of Hispanics in the
corporate and public sectors." 98 Indeed, the conference, sponsored by
Silicon Graphics, Sun Microsystems, Apple Computers, AT&T, and
similar employers, was largely aimed at high school and college students
and advised them regarding self-presentation and career planning. The
mission was clearly to facilitate the inclusion of Hispanics in existing
corporate culture, and transformation of that culture only to the extent of
including more Hispanics.
This discussion is not intended to denigrate the importance of these
goals or the efficacy of the NHEA's efforts. Rather, it is intended to
question the disjunction between the corporate world uniformly invoked in
the literature and the communications of employee network groups like
NHEA or the Apple caucuses, and Silicon Valley's high-velocity labor
market. The literature and speeches at the conference invoked images of a
world of loyalty to the corporation, advancement through internal
promotion ladders ("upward mobility"), and the concept of fitting into an
existing corporate culture. There was no reference to a high-velocity labor
market involving frequent job changes, startups, informal exchange of
information and know-how sharing among firms. The intense devotion of
identity caucuses and their spokespersons to the world of corporate loyalty,
careers, and promotions, may show that world to be in better shape than
this article too quickly assumes. On the other hand, it may be that there is a
kind of deeper affinity between network groups and the hierarchical
corporation, with internal labor markets, that may impede the network
groups' recognition of newer and more vital ways of operating labor
markets.
Employee network groups, if they link with groups at other firms and
community groups, could play a more important role in future labor
markets than they currently play. They could take on some of the
intermediary functions previously discussed, such as job matching and
information, benefits delivery, and the additional functions of political and
community advocacy. Such linked organizations could play a larger role in
remedying problems of discrimination.99 It will be necessary, however, for
97. See generally HECKSCHER, supra note 23 (writing on the history of formal labor
unions in the United States and the current and future role of associational unions in shaping
the American workplace).
98. Id.
99. See generally HYDE, supra note * (exploring economic and legal issues inherent in
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these organizations to transcend a model of loyalty to hierarchical
corporations with career ladders, and imagine functioning in high-velocity
labor markets. Unless this occurs, it is hard to imagine any interesting
consequences of corporate-oriented ethnic caucuses.
V. WOMEN'S NETWORKS
Women's networks will provide an interesting test over the next few
years of the potential for identity-based groups to cross the boundaries of
the firm and perform informational or other economic functions in a high-
velocity labor market. The record on the role of women's networks to date
is rather sparse.
Silicon Valley's technology firms simultaneously offer unusual
opportunities and obstacles to the careers of women as a group. Women
are commonly chief financial officers or chief counsels, as a result of the
formation of new companies, recent hiring, and a meritocratic culture.
Obstacles revealed by surveys include balancing punishing work schedules
with family obligations, and the pressure to conform to a masculine
atmosphere. 100
A few formal network organizations of women transcend firm
boundaries. Like the Chinese and Indian organizations studied by
Saxenian, these networks are particularly oriented toward facilitating
entrepreneurship through access to capital and other technical support.'01
The best-known is the Forum for Women Entrepreneurs, which claims
through programs and networks to have assisted women in raising over
$600 million in starting businesses in 2000.102 They run formal programs
in which women entrepreneurs teach small groups of potential
entrepreneurs.0 3 Other formal groups include Silicon Valley Webgrrls,
San Francisco Women on the Web, and Women in Multimedia.' 4 These
groups are known entirely by self-description and journalism. There are no
ethnographies of these formal or informal organizations, and they must
involve very few women. They never came up in interviews with women
in the Valley, despite my questions on this topic.
For women who plan to remain employees, or to be self-employed but
not an entrepreneur, and who seek support in career planning or advocacy,
a high-velocity labor market).
100. WOMEN OF SILICON VALLEY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: WOMEN IN THE SILICON
VALLEY ECONOMY 15-22 (2001), available at http://www.womenofsv.org.
101. See SAXENIAN, supra note 77.
102. WOMEN OF SILICON VALLEY, supra note 100, at 14.
103. Id.
104. See Karen Solomon, Girls' Night Out: Women Executives Network on Their Own
Terms, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Aug. 7, 2000, available at
http:l/www.thestandard.comlarticle/0,1902,17325,00.html.
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or action for better child care, there seem to be few formal organizations.
Women's career planning, like men's, often involves informal networks. A
typical informal network consists of people one knew from former jobs,
neighbors, and other social acquaintances. Naturally, people hear about
jobs, new products and so on through whatever informal networks they
employ, but no evidence was found to suggest that informal networks of
women play any special role.
It is too soon to conclude that women's networks will function
similarly to any other kind of network, such as Chinese engineers, or
website designers who once worked together. There are some intriguing
hints in the literature that they may play unique roles. For example, the
Stanford Project on Emerging Companies (hereinafter "SPEC") has
reported the surprising fact that start-ups with high initial representation of
women in core technical and scientific roles will have significantly fewer
administrators in subsequent years. In the typical firm, about twenty-five
percent of these roles were filled by females in its founding year. Such a
firm would have only eighty percent as many full-time administrators in
subsequent years, as compared to an all-male firm.'05 The numbers were
large, and held constant across different variables. Why should this be?
SPEC suggests a number of possible explanations. For instance, one such
justification is that men like having titles."0 6 But in more recent work,
SPEC explores the role of network ties."'7 Women are common in start-ups
typically when they enter through network ties to the founders, and a firm
with such network ties has richer informal control and needs fewer formal
administrators 0 s Surveys reveal that women in high-tech fields attribute
unusual importance to the role of networks and mentors in advancing their
careers.'09 In short, there is much to learn about informal networks in high-
velocity labor markets and any gender differences in their use.
105. See James N. Baron et al., Building the Iron Cage: Determinants of Managerial
Intensity in the Early Years of Organizations, 64 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 527, 527-47
(1999) (examining how founding conditions shape the growth of management and
administration in a sample of young technology companies in California's Silicon Valley).
106. Id. at 533.
107. See James N. Baron et al., Gender and the Organization-Building Process in Young,
High-Tech Finns, in THE NEW ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY: DEVELOPMENTS IN AN EMERGING
FIELD (forthcoming 2003).
108. Id.
109. WOMEN OF SILICON VALLEY, supra note 100, at 22 (reporting that forty-eight
percent of women employed in the technology sector agree strongly "that developing
networks and meeting the right people" are important to advancing in their career).
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VI. NEW ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE MOBILE WORKFORCE: WORKING
PARTNERSHIPS, WASHTECH, WORKING TODAY, IMMIGRANTS
SUPPORT NETWORK
New organizations have been created for mobile, high-tech workers,
partly for those workers' sake, and partly because existing unions and some
foundations regard them as potential prototypes for groups serving other
contingent workers. These new organizations have attracted some of the
most thoughtful, imaginative, and energetic people interested in labor
issues, though their success has been limited to date. Particularly active in
Silicon Valley are Working Partnerships, which is affiliated with the South
Bay Labor Council AFL-CIO, and the Immigrants Support Network. Two
other particularly interesting organizations are not yet active in the Valley.
They are included here because the Valley would be an obvious next
location for them if they achieve success. These are the specialized
projects of the Communication Workers, which is aimed at employees of
Microsoft in Seattle and IBM in upstate New York, and Working Today of
New York City.
A. Working Partnerships/South Bay Labor Council AFL-CIO
The union movement in the Valley has chosen some unusual forms
through which to organize low-wage workers, particularly temporary and
contingent workers. Working Partnerships USA (hereinafter "Working
Partnerships"), founded in 1995, is affiliated directly with the Council,
rather than any particular affiliated union."0 The group's title is intended
to convey a desire to build bridges between organized labor and nonunion
workers."' Working Partnerships has issued a series of research reports on
the Silicon Valley economy, work organization, and housing 1 2 It has
organized political campaigns around "living wage" ordinances enacted to
raise labor standards in the contracts of local governments, and on behalf of
110. Telephone interview with Amy B. Dean, President, Working Partnerships USA,
Oct. 10, 2001.
111. Id.
112. See Chris Benner & Amy Dean, Labor in the New Economy: Lessons from Labor
Organizing in Silicon Valley, in NONSTANDARD WORK: THE NATURE AND CHALLENGES OF
CHANGING EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS 361 (Franqoise Carr6 et al. eds., 2000) (discussing
the significant components of a new model of employee representation conceived at the
Temporary Worker Employment Project); Aaron Bernstein, Down and Out in Silicon
Valley, Bus. WK., Mar. 27, 2000, at 76 (reporting on the plight of low-wage Silicon Valley
workers left behind during the economic boom); see also Silicon Valley@Work, at
http://www.atwork.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2002) (using a website forum to organize for
justice in Silicon Valley, especially with regard to low wage workers and affordable
housing).
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favored candidates 13 It also runs leadership training courses for members
of neighborhood associations in San Jose and other community leaders.114
Most intriguingly, Working Partnerships opened its own temporary
help agency, hoping to compete with existing temp agencies while
maintaining high labor standards 1 5 In October 2001, it was placing forty
or fifty individuals a week for 1,200 hours on average.116 Its members
work both in entry-level positions such as office temps, receptionists, and
administrators, as well as systems administrators, network administrators,
and cablers outsourced to Pacific Gas & Electric.
1 7
The staffing agency incorporates training and upward career
mobility." s It offers training in software skills and programming languages
like Java and Juniper; A+, a standard training in hardware literacy; and
Cisco and other certifications for network administrators and support
staff."9 The unique supposed advantage of a union-affiliated staffing
agency is this combination of job placement, training, and employee
mobility. In contrast, junior colleges offer some training, but not linked to
specific jobs. 120 Employers also offer some training, but rarely for mobile
employees.121 Most staffing agencies offer little or no training.122 The
theoretical and practical advantage of an employee-run organization is the
combination of all these benefits in one place. Working Partnerships'
employees currently are enrolled in a Kaiser health plan for mobile
employees during the time that they are working.'23 The next project will
be the creation of a trust fund, based on the model used by construction
unions, into which employers will pay pennies per hour worked.124 The
objective will be to permit some coverage of employees during the periods
when they are between placements.125
All of these initiatives reflect a strategy of positioning worker
organizations in larger political and geographic communities, not merely
inside traditional firms, reflecting the decline in internal labor markets and
one-firm careers. Thus, the political and community activity is not merely
a device to organize a traditional union. It is a new model of union
organizing that, if successful, will result in a very different type of union.
113. See sources cited supra note 112.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Telephone interview with Amy Dean, supra note 110.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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For example, its training courses and self-directed tutorials are
administered jointly with the Black Chamber of Commerce. 126 It has warm,
though less formal, ties with the Hispanic and Vietnamese Chambers of
Commerce.' 27 Amy Dean pointed out how unusual these business ties are
for a union. Every Labor Day, Working Partnerships, like other unions,
sends representatives to speak at over eighty churches and synagogues,
where congregants are asked to sign cards supporting its projects.1lz While
this publicity technique is not unique to Working Partnerships, it takes on a
different meaning in an organization devoted to community advocacy as
much as worker representation. American unions have been organized
around specific industries, or specific crafts, but there is little precedent for
unions organized around regions and communities. Nor can one point to
successful unions organized around a way of working, such as temporary
or contingent, as opposed to a craft or job description, such as carpentry or
waitressing. Working Partnerships draws on imaginative recent thinking
on new ways to organize unions.' It combines elements of an
associational union, 3 ° a regional craft union,"' and a union of low-income
service workers, organized around their work organization as opposed to
craft or industry. 3 2  Other scholarship supports Working Partnerships'
union-run job referral system133 and training for workers in dead-end jobs
to create career paths that lead out of those jobs. 34 A project this ambitious
cannot be expected to achieve instant success. It will take time to sort out
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Amy B. Dean, Remarks to the National Press Club, Presentation to National
Conference on the Next Agenda, organized by the Campaign for America's Future (Feb. 28,
2001), available at http://www.atvorkorg, at 10.
129. Much of this scholarship is reviewed in Katherine V.W. Stone, The New
Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and
Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 631-51 (2001) (suggesting methods to address
problems of insecurity, unfairness, and injustice arising from the temporary nature of
modem employer-employee relations).
130. See generally HECKSCHER, supra note 23 (discussing the history of formal labor
unions in the United States and the current and future role of associational unions in shaping
the American workplace).
131. See generally DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, DISHING IT OUT: WAITRESSES AND THEIR
UNIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991) (discussing the history and controversies
surrounding the waitress as a craft unionist).
132. See Howard Wial, The Emerging Organizational Structure of Unionism in Low-
Wage Services, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 671, 692-93 (1993) (describing a model whereby low-
wage workers are organized geographically along loose occupational lines).
133. See Eileen Silverstein & Peter Goselin, Intentionally Impermanent Employment and
the Paradox of Productivity, 26 STETSON L. REv. 1, 36-51 (1996) (proposing that unions act
as employment agents for contingent workers).
134. See STEPHEN A. HERZENBERG ET AL., NEW RULES FOR A NEW ECONOMY:
EMPLOYMENT AND OPPORTUNITY IN POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA 123-148 (1998) (exploring
creation of career paths in the absence of tradional, hierarchical firms).
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what works.
B. Immigrants Support Network
More successful numerically is a group focused entirely on political
representation, the Immigrants Support Network, representing mainly
individuals working under "H-lB visas," or temporary visas issued to
skilled individuals to fill supposed labor shortages. The entire program is
controversial. 135 High-technology businesses around the country are often
heavy users of such H-lB workers, nowhere more so than in Silicon
Valley. The prototypical H-lB worker is a computer programmer from
India (which provides almost half of all H-lBs), twenty-eight years old,
and earns around $45,000 a year.
136
The visa program requires repeated Congressional reauthorization, a
political process in which employers are dominant. In 2000, the year of the
most recent reenactment, this requirement authorized 195,000 H-lB visas
annually, each effective for six years. Visa holders must be sponsored by
their United States employer, may not be self-employed, and may have
difficulties changing jobs if their first job does not work out. Critics of the
program charge that it depresses salaries for programmers.13 7 They claim
that if employers were unable to hire programmers on short visas, they
would be able to find plenty of programmers, including older programmers
and graduates of less-prestigious U.S. institutions. 3 ' Employers would
have to pay these individuals more than $45,000 a year.139 However, these
criticisms have not been influential in the legislative process. Their
proponents are not well-organized and have not received effective support
from professional associations or organized labor.
140
H-lB visa holders' most frequent requests are that they would like a
smoother transition to permanent resident status and increased mobility
among jobs that are not with their original visa sponsor. 141 The Immigrants
135. See generally HYDE, supra note * (exploring economic and legal issues inherent in
a high-velocity labor market).
136. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, H-lB FOREIGN WORKERS: BErrER CONTROLS
NEEDED TO HELP EMPLOYERS AND PROTECT WORKERS 4 (Sept. 7, 2000), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/heOO157.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2001).
137. The most prominent academic critic of the program is Professor Norman Matloff of
the Computer Science Department at the University of California at Davis. His constantly-
updated web page is an invaluable source of information. Norman Matloff, Debunking the
Myth of a Desperate Software Labor Shortage, at http://heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/itaa.real.html
(last visited Dec. 5, 2001).
138. Id.
139. See generally HYDE, supra note * (indicating that the allegations that the visa
programs depress programmers' salaries may have merit).
140. Matloff, supra note 137.
141. Id.
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Support Network (hereinafter "ISN") was formed after the 1998 H-lB
process by visa holders who felt they required representation independent
of employer groups for these concerns. 42 It appears to be funded largely
by successful entrepreneurs of Indian origin, such as Kanwal Rekhi.
143
These entrepreneurs have no direct economic interest in reforming the H-
lB program to meet visa holders' complaints. Rather, they fund the
organization out of pride in Indian contributions to high technology and
desire to assist Indian nationals in immigration. Still, it seems only a
matter of time before the interests of H-lB visa holders conflict with some
interest of the businessmen who fund their organization. Norman Matloff
claims that the ISN spent heavily to employ expensive lobbyists in the
2000 legislative process, despite receiving contributions from only about
700 of the 15,000 individuals it claims as "members."' 44 It achieved some
success in that 2000 lobbying initiative, obtaining extensions of H-1B visas
for those whose permanent resident applications were being processed, and
permission for employers to expedite the H-lB process for a fee. The
ISN's next goal is abolition of the country quota on permanent resident
cards. 141
Does the ISN belong in an article on employee organization? It is
limited to immigrants, receives funds from employers, and largely lobbies
around particular political interests. Does that mean that it is not an
employee organization? Or is this the kind of employee organization of the
future, linking employees across employers, moving from workplace to
political advocacy, drawing strength from identity ties? The future of the
ISN will tell us a great deal about the future of employee organization.
Will it link with other employee groups, such as the South Bay Labor
Council? The AFL-CIO's position on immigration has recently changed
sharply. It no longer opposes immigration as a threat to current U.S.
jobholders. It now welcomes immigration and seeks to organize
immigrants. Consistent with that position, it did not oppose extension of
the H-1B program. However, neither the AFL-CIO, nor any of its
affiliates, has made efforts to organize H-lB workers.
Could the ISN and organized labor such as Working Partnerships
142. Id.
143. See Aseem Chhabra, Rekhi's Visa Stand Raises a Ruckus, at
http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/may/l0usspec.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2001) (reporting
that Mr. Rekhi, with a reported net worth of $500 million, has recently joined the ISN
board).
144. Posting of Norman Matloff, Department of Computer Science, University of
California, Davis, matloff@cs.ucdavis.edu, to Age Discrimination/H-lB Visa Mailing List
(May 7, 2001) (copy on file with author).
145. Raj Jayadev, Look Who's Organizing - High-Level Tech Workers Form New Labor
Group, at http:llwww.pacificnews.org/contentlpns/2001/aug/0815techlabor.html (last
visited Dec. 5, 2001).
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work for a common cause? Such a joint program might seek ease of
immigration, high employment standards, and unrestricted mobility for all
workers, including immigrants. 46 In such a hypothetical alliance, these
labor organizations would be turning their back on older programmers
allegedly displaced by immigrants. However, this concern might not be an
obstacle to such an alliance, in part because there are questions about the
size of the group of displaced older programmers. Organized labor groups
might well conclude that its future lies with newer immigrants rather than
with older IT professionals who never affiliated with labor organizations.
Could the ISN, either by itself or with assistance from organized labor,
become an advocate for immigrants in disputes with their employers or
sponsors, in addition to becoming a lobbyist in Congress? Could the ethnic
pride and energy of Silicon Valley's immigrant communities fuel
successful organizing for programmers, as it has for janitors?
C. Communication Workers Projects Aimed at IT Workers
The Communication Workers of America (hereinafter "CWA"),
which represents many workers at older telephone companies, has set up
two innovative projects to advance the interests of information
professionals: the Washington Alliance of Technology Workers
(hereinafter "WashTech") in Seattle, and the Alliance@IBM in Endicott,
New York. These projects advance workers' interests without acting as
their legal bargaining representative, and thus have been described as
"virtual unions."' 47
WashTech is actually Local 37083 of the Communication Workers,
but does not yet function as a bargaining representative for its members.1
4
1
WashTech focuses on the workers at Microsoft who are nominal
employees of temporary help agencies. In the mid-1990's, the Ninth
Circuit found that some of these individuals were legally employees of
Microsoft.' 49  Microsoft has changed its practices since then, and
presumably most individuals whom it classifies presently as agency
employees would also be found to be agency employees in law. WashTech
provides lobbying, training, and informational services to these temporary
146. In other words, ending constraints on all workers' free mobility, such as covenants
not to compete and some aspects of trade secrets law discussed in HYDE, supra note *, chs. 2
& 3, is consistent with abolishing those constraints limited to the H-lB visa program.
147. Wayne J. Diamond & Richard B. Freeman, Will Unionism Prosper in Cyber-Space?
The Promise of the Internet for Employee Organization, NBER WORKING PAPER 8483, at 15-
16 (October 2001), available at http://papersnber.org/papers/W84483.
148. Virginia L. DuRivage, CWA's Organizing Strategies: Transforming Contract Jobs
into Union Jobs, in NONSTANDARD WORK, supra note 112, at 377-391.
149. Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 120 F.3d 1006, 1006 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
1098 (1998).
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employees. While WashTech did not initiate the Vizcaino litigation, it kept
its members informed about it. It has lobbied in the State of Washington
for access to personnel records and for favorable employment standards
treatment for agency employees, and has offered training classes in
software programming and other skills. It has requested bargaining
recognition, albeit unsuccessfully, from at least four temporary agencies.
However, like Working Partnerships, WashTech aspires to anchor its
organization in an industry and geographic area, not just in a collective
bargaining relationship. In the words of Larry Cohen, executive vice
president of the CWA, at WashTech "what sustains people is not collective
bargaining, but creating a community of people. '150 Like the ISN or any
web-based organization, it has many more individuals visiting its webpage
and joining for specific actions than it has dues-paying members. As of
June 2001, there were only 225 such members. 5
Alliance@IBM, another CWA affiliate, was formed in the Summer of
1999 in response to the electronic protests against IBM's proposed
reductions in pensions, discussed earlier in this article.152  Its main
constituency appears to be long-time IBM employees concerned about
outsourcing and downsizing. 53 Alliance@IBM does not appear to have
reached out to the temporary employees served by WashTech, or to
immigrants on H-1B visas served by ISN. The interests of both of those
groups may conflict with those of the career IBM employees. Perhaps at
some point the CWA will have to confront this conflict, though at the
moment it is free to organize opportunistically, which RedHerring
magazine calls "the venture capital approach to unionizing."1 54 The CWA
is not yet active in Silicon Valley, but this would be an obvious next arena
if it feels that either WashTech or Alliance@IBM has been successful.
D. Working Today
Working Today was founded to represent mobile individuals, mostly
self-employed, who lack ties to a single employer. So far, it has been
funded more by foundations than by its members. Some of its founders,
such as Columbia sociologist Herbert Gans, contemplated a group that
would seek to convert such contingent work into more traditional, stable
work, but the group eventually followed the path of other organizations
150. Steven Greenhouse, Five Questions for Larry Cohen: Renewing a Union in the New
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2000, at BU4.
151. See Jonathan Littman, Phone union attempts dial-up Internet connection,
REDHERRING (June 19, 2001), at http://www.redherring.com/insider /2001/ 0619/
420019642.html.
152. Kahn, supra note 36.
153. See Littman, supra note 151.
154. Id.
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reviewed in this section. Working Today accepts the appeal of self-
employment and a mobile workforce, and now hopes to learn what kinds of
benefits appeal to such a group, how to market benefits to them, and what
other kinds of economic and political representation they need. 55 Its first
pilot project, launched in 2001, seeks to market health insurance to website
designers in New York City. The group has designed what it believes will
be an attractive package of portable benefits, even though they are still
fairly expensive. It remains to be seen whether a participatory or
democratic employee organization will have any advantage over the private
sector in the marketing of benefits such as health insurance.
VII. SUMMING UP: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION IN HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY
The brutal truth is that Silicon Valley attained its present technological
and economic preeminence without formal employee organization. It is
difficult to see why this will change any time soon. The nascent
organizations discussed in this article-unions, networks, caucuses, new
organizations-may be interesting straws in the wind, and may present
intriguing legal or economic issues. However, none of these organizations
has achieved much importance. Put another way, employee organizations
only come up in interviews when the interviewer specifically asks about
them. Employee organizations will never be discussed when the
conversation concerns where an employee worked, was an Human
Resources director, or counselor.
Many managers believe that employee organization is fundamentally
incompatible with high-technology employment, in particular with the
flexibility and energy demanded of and received from employees. When
asked whether Cisco had formal women's or Black caucuses like Apple's,
Michael LaBianca, the lawyer who handles employment matters, laughed
and said, "People are too busy to think about anything else. ' 156 Managers
would nearly all interpret a story like the Individuate story as one in which
naive attempts at formal organization actually converted minor discontent
into a serious problem. It is difficult to be optimistic about the new groups
that hope to get employees into formal organizations by meeting employee
desires for training (WashTech), benefits (Working Today), or job
placement (Working Partnerships). Private organizations already exist to
meet these needs, and there seems no practical or theoretical reason why an
employee organization should be able to provide better courses, or
insurance plans, than private companies.
155. Sara Horowitz, New Thinking on Worker Groups' Role in a Flexible Economy, in
NONSTANDARD WORK, supra note 112, at 393-398.
156. Interview with Michael LaBianca, Cisco, in San Jose, Cal. (June 2001).
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It is easier to imagine a role for employee organization in the low-
wage sector of the Silicon Valley labor market: the office temps, product
testers, and perhaps low-level programmers. The model that would work
best for them, however, may not be any of the new organizations designed
for mobile workers. Rather, low-wage employees need a good, old-
fashioned construction-type union. The employer on a unionized
construction job pays contractual amounts, per hour worked, into trusts,
which are jointly administered by the union and the employers, and pay
health, vacation, and retirement benefits. This is the best institution ever
designed for providing income stability, insurance, and retirement to what
is really a very contingent work force. It is puzzling that so much energy
has been put into designing new organizations for a mobile workforce,
when United States law and practice already provide an excellent blueprint.
Part of the problem with adapting the construction union model to the
Silicon Valley market is the fact that construction work is a kind of
contingent work, but one in which unions make earnings less contingent.
Many construction workers work for many different contractors and on
many jobs. Despite this uncertainty, construction workers are not usually
included in discussions of "contingent" work. The difference is the union.
Construction workers who are represented by a labor union typically have
health insurance (87.1%), paid vacations, and a pension (67%).57
Construction employees who are not represented by a union normally have
no health insurance (only 41.4% get it through work) or pension (only 22%
have one).158 While the oldest construction unions involve highly-skilled
employees, this structure has also been employed by laborers and others
who have less formal training. Also, construction unions often operate
hiring halls that provide labor to contractors on request. While this can
facilitate administration of the benefits plans, it is not necessary for their
success. Therefore, there is no obvious reason why office temps and other
mobile, less-skilled employees could not be organized into unions that
would administer benefits and might, or might not, take on training and job
placement functions.
Why do temps not have construction-type unions? We cannot be
confident that temps would not join unions if they could. Of course, many
people feel that it is generally true of all United States unions that the legal
obstacles to their organization are so serious as to depress levels of
organization below existing demand.5 9 Unions for mobile temps face
157. CENTER TO PROTECT WORKERS' RIGHTS, THE CONSTRUCTION CHART BOOK: THE
U.S. CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AND ITS WORKERS, charts 3, 26, 27 (2d ed. 1998).
158. Id.
159. See generally PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990) (asserting that U.S. labor laws discourage union
organization); FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 18.
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problems in addition to these general impediments to unionization. The
chief specific legal impediment to the organizations proposed for mobile
employees is the lack of authority in the National Labor Relations Board to
certify a bargaining unit with multiple employers. Such bargaining does
take place, but only with the voluntary consent of the employer, who is free
to withdraw from multi-employer bargaining at any time except when new
contract negotiations are actually underway.
The NLRB has retreated from some extensions of this doctrine that
impeded union organization among temporary help workers. For years, the
NLRB took the position that including temporary-help employees in a
bargaining unit with regular employees was a kind of multi-employer
bargaining that required the mutual consent of the temporary help agency
and the client firm. The NLRB will now certify a unit of all employees
working for one client-regular employees and those jointly employed by
the temp agency can bargain with the client. The NLRB will also certify a
unit of all the temporary employees working at various locations but
referred by the same temp agency, in order to bargain with that temp
agency. It is possible that these changes will spark new union organizing
among temporary help employees. However, they represent the outer
limits of the NLRB's power. A unit of all the temps who work for many
different clients is considered a multi-employer unit and, consequently,
bargaining is voluntary for each client.160  Nor does the NLRB have
authority to force any client or temp agency to bargain jointly with the
employees whom they jointly employ. Further, a congressional
amendment to the National Labor Relations Act to facilitate multi-
employer units is not imminent.
However, multi-employer bargaining for temps can come about
through the employer's voluntary actions, which is not totally far-fetched in
Silicon Valley. After all, Valley employers preferred that their cleaning
contractors bargain with the Service Employees, rather than face potential
product boycotts. Therefore, while the most realistic assessment of the
future is that rates of union organization in Silicon Valley will continue to
be very low, if organization increases, it will not be the new-fangled
caucuses, associations, and networks. Rather, the construction union form
will turn out to be adaptable to serve other individuals who work for many
different employers.
160. See In re M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 173, 1 (2000) (reaffirming the
employer consent requirement for the creation of true multi-employer units involving
separate user employers).
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